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Abstract. Online dating sites are experiencing a rise in popularity, with one in
five relationships in the United States starting on one of these sites. Online dat-
ing sites provide a valuable platform not only for single people trying to meet a
life partner, but also for cybercriminals, who see in people looking for love easy
victims for scams. Such scams span from schemes similar to traditional adver-
tisement of illicit services or goods (i.e., spam) to advanced schemes, in which
the victim starts a long-distance relationship with the scammer and is eventually
extorted money.
In this paper we perform the first large-scale study of online dating scams. We
analyze the scam accounts detected on a popular online dating site over a period
of eleven months, and provide a taxonomy of the different types of scammers that
are active in the online dating landscape. We show that different types of scam-
mers target a different demographics on the site, and therefore set up accounts
with different characteristics. Our results shed light on the threats associated to
online dating scams, and can help researchers and practitioners in developing
effective countermeasures to fight them.
1 Introduction
Online dating sites have become a popular solution for users to meet people and start
relationships. The most popular dating sites have between 15 and 20 million active
members, and the revenue of the whole online dating industry in 2012 was estimated
to exceed one billion dollars [4]. As it happens for any popular online service, online
dating sites attract cybercriminals too. This should not surprise, since online services are
commonly plagued with spam [19] and malware [6]. Online dating sites, however, have
a very different purpose than common online services: meeting people in real life and
possibly starting a relationship. For this reason, such services attract more advanced
scammers than other online services, who exploit the vulnerable emotional state of
online dating users for financial gain [28]. As an example, scammers commonly set
up fake accounts on an online dating site, start interacting with a user on the site, and
then lure her into sending them money, for example to pay for the flight needed to
meet in person [36]. Such scams are similar in spirit to the infamous “419 scams,”
in which scammers ask their victims to send them a sum of money to establish trust
and then promise to transfer a very large sum to them [17, 18, 23, 25]. Online dating
scams, however, are more insidious than “419 scams,” because they target emotionally
vulnerable people looking for love.
Compared to traditional malicious activity on online services, the one happening
on online dating sites shows three main differences. The first difference is that mali-
cious activity on online services (social networks, blogs, webmail services) is typically
run in large-scale campaigns [13,16]. As a result of this, malicious activity is automati-
cally generated and can be detected by leveraging similarities across the same malicious
campaign [26,37]. When dealing with online dating sites however, this assumption does
not hold anymore: scammers are usually real people, writing personalized messages to
their victims [36]. The second difference is that, unlike traditional spam and malware
attacks, online dating scams can develop over a long period of time. Scammers typically
exchange many messages with their victims to win their trust, before performing the ac-
tual scam [36]. In some cases, the scam is performed once the victim and the scammer
meet in person. The third difference is that, unlike other online services, online dating
sites are designed to put in contact people who do not know each other. For this reason,
the concept of unsolicited message, which is the core of traditional anti-spam systems,
does not have any meaning when applied to online dating sites: all messages received
on such sites are in fact unsolicited.
The landscape of online dating scams is widely unstudied by the research commu-
nity. Previous research in this field focused on describing single scam schemes, and
relied on descriptions of single incidents instead of performing large-scale measure-
ments of the phenomenon [28, 36]. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive
study of scams targeting online dating sites. We analyze the accounts used by scam-
mers that have been identified over a period of one year on a large online dating site
in China. Since the operators of the dating site do not want the name of the service to
be disclosed, we will refer to it as DATINGSITE in this paper. We discuss the different
types of scams that we identified, showing that the threats that online dating users are
exposed to are usually different than the ones that are faced by the users of traditional
online services (such as Online Social Networks).
Given the different nature of the threats that users face on online dating sites, current
systems that detect malicious activity on online services are not enough to protect the
users of such sites. This paper aims at providing the research community with insights
on how online dating scammers operate, on the types of threats that users face on such
platforms, and on typical traits and behaviors of the accounts that are used by scammers
to perform their operations. We hope that our observations will shed some light on the
problem of online dating scams, and help researchers and online dating sites operators
develop better detection methods to keep their users safe.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
– We discuss the threat model associated with scammers operating on online dating
sites, outlining the differences between this type of malicious activity and the one
that is found on other online services.
– We analyze more than 500,000 accounts used by scammers on a popular online
dating site, and provide a taxonomy of the most prevalent online dating scams. In
particular, we identified four types of scams. Cybercriminals performing different
types of scams present a different modus operandi in interacting with victims, and
a different level of sophistication.
– We provide detailed statistics and case studies on the detected scam accounts. We
show that different types of scams target different demographics on the site, and
that specific scam schemes have a higher success in receiving attention by the users
of online dating sites.
2 Background and Problem Study
In this section, we first describe online dating sites in general, giving an overview of the
functionalities that are typically offered by these sites to their users. Then, we describe
the online dating site that we analyzed in this paper.
2.1 Online Dating Sites
There are a wealth of online dating sites on the Internet. Some of them cater to audiences
with a specific ethnic or cultural background (e.g., christianmingle.com), while
some others are targeted at all types of users (e.g., match.com). Some sites just aim
at making people meet, while others have specific types of relationships as a target (for
example marriage).
In general, the first thing users have to do after signing up on an online dating site
is setting up a profile. The profile is what other users see, and having a complete and
well-written one influences the first impression that possible matches have of the per-
son [22]. Users are encouraged to add personal pictures and a description of themselves
to the profile. In addition, people can add information about their favorite activities and
hobbies. Users are required to add their sexual preference as well, and can specify the
age range of the people they would like to meet.
All the information that the user inputs is processed by a matching algorithm. The
algorithm compares the information on the user’s profile with the one on the profiles of
possible matches and displays to the user the profiles of people that she would probably
like. The user can then review these suggestions and contact those people with whom
she wants to start a conversation. Some sites allow users to browse all profiles on the
site, while others restrict them to only see those profiles that were highly ranked as
possible matches for her [1].
A major difference between online dating sites is the subscription price: unlike on-
line social networks, creating a profile on an online dating site is usually not free, and
the user has to pay a monthly subscription to use the functionalities of the site. A sub-
scription to a popular online dating site ranges from $13 and $24 per month [3]. On the
other hand, a handful of online dating sites (for example okcupid.com [2]) offer free
subscriptions, and their websites feature advertisements, similarly to what happens on
traditional online social network sites.
The amount of effort required to create an online dating profile influences the way
in which cybercriminals use these services. Intuitively, the high price of subscription
to most of these websites makes is unsuitable for spammers to create fake accounts in
bulk. Similarly, the high amount of information needed to create a believable profile
on the free online dating sites limits the effectiveness of mass-created fake accounts.
For this reason, miscreants use online dating sites to perform more advanced scams,
which rely on personal interactions and social engineering. We will describe the types
of scams that we identified on the online dating site that we analyzed in Section 4.
2.2 Case Study: A Large Chinese Dating Site
We performed our analysis on a large online dating site in China. For confidentiality
reasons, we will refer to it as DATINGSITE in this paper. DATINGSITE has more than
10 million users, which gives it a comparable user base to the most successful online
dating sites worldwide.
DATINGSITE presents all the elements typical of online dating sites that we de-
scribed. After registering, users have to set up a profile, including information such
as their age, gender, education, marital status, etc. Users can then browse other users’
profiles and contact people they like.
Unlike most online dating sites, users can create a profile on DATINGSITE for free.
This fact makes it a particularly convenient platform for scammers, who can set up their
accounts at no cost. To keep their users safe from scammers, DATINGSITE deployed a
number of detection mechanisms that are able to flag possible scam accounts. Because
the false positives of such systems are higher than what is considered acceptable in a
production system, and blocking a legitimate account by mistake would be very neg-
ative for the dating site’s reputation, DATINGSITE employs a team of experts that vet
the flagged accounts, deciding which ones actually belong to scammers. If an account
is detected as controlled by a scammer, the profile is “frozen” until the user confirms
her identity and is forbidden from contacting other profiles on the site. In this paper, we
analyze the accounts flagged as belonging to scammers by these human specialists over
a period of one year.
2.3 Threat Model: Online Dating Scams
As we mentioned earlier, the main difference between traditional online services and
online dating sites is that the latter are designed to put in contact people who have no
connection whatsoever. In this context, the concept of unsolicited message, which is a
strong indicator of maliciousness on other online services, has no meaning: all messages
are “unsolicited,” but users are happy to receive them instead of being annoyed by them.
For this reason, we need to go beyond considering any unsolicited message as malicious
and formulate a more advanced threat model.
In this paper, we consider an online dating user a scammer if he/she is using the
service to take advantage (often economic) of another user. A scammer will set up one
or more accounts on the online dating site, and interact with the users of the site. We
call such accounts scam accounts . Online dating scams can be more or less sophisti-
cated. In some cases, the scam accounts are just advertising goods or services, similarly
to traditional spam (for example escort services). In this case the scam content (for ex-
ample the contact information of the escort agency) is sent to the victim very early,
possibly in the first message that is exchanged. In some other cases, however, scam-
mers are more sophisticated, and establish a long-distance relationship with the victim
before performing the actual scam. In many cases, the scammer tries to convince the
victim to continue the conversation on a different medium, for example Skype. This is
an additional reason why online dating scams are difficult to the detect: often the online
dating site administrators do not see the scam happening, because the scammer and the
victim have moved to a different way of communicating.
In the rest of the paper we first describe the way in which we collected a set of more
than 500,000 scam accounts on DATINGSITE. We then present a taxonomy of the scam
accounts that we observed, and discuss some typical characteristics of such accounts
that could be used for detection.
3 Methodology
Given the difficulty of automatically detecting advanced scam accounts, online dating
sites employ customer-service specialists who manually review suspicious profiles and
suspend the ones that belong to scammers. These customer-service specialists are ex-
perts in detecting scammers, and therefore they can reliably assess the maliciousness
of an account. However, it is unfeasible (and intrusive) for these specialists to analyze
every single profile on the site and assess its maliciousness. For this reason, specialists
are aided by automatic programs that narrow down the number of possible scammers
as much as possible. Ideally, these detection systems should have high accuracy, so
that the human specialists can quickly decide whether a profile belongs to a scammer.
Their accuracy, however, is not high enough to justify a completely-automated scam
detection system – this is due to the complex nature of online dating scams as we pre-
viously discussed. In addition, the cost of false positives for the company is very high:
a user having his/her account suspended by mistake would leave the site and move to a
competitor, and even ask for a refund in case of a paid dating site.
In the following, we briefly describe the four detection systems that help the cus-
tomer service specialists at DATINGSITE in detecting scam accounts. Two of the au-
thors of this paper worked on the development of such systems. Because these systems
resemble, in large part, anti-spam systems that have been proposed by the research com-
munity over the years, we do not claim that they are novel, and we include them for the
sake of completeness, and to give the reader a better idea of how the dataset of scam
accounts used in the rest of the study was collected.
3.1 Behavioral-based Detection System
The goal of scammers on online dating sites is very different from the one of legitimate
users: while legitimate users want to get to know new people, and possibly start a ro-
mantic relationship, scammers seek vulnerable and gullible victims, with the purpose
of extorting money from them. For this reason, the behavior of accounts controlled by
scammers is likely to show differences than the one of legitimate users. To capture these
differences, DATINGSITE developed a detection system that models the typical behav-
ior of scam accounts (as opposed to legitimate accounts). This system looks at two types
of account characteristics. The first one are profile traits that scam accounts typically
show (as we will see in Section 6, specific types of scam accounts pose as a particular
demographic to appeal a particular type of victim). The second type of characteristics
are related to the typical behavior of scam accounts. Such characteristics include the
number of conversations initiated simultaneously, the time waited between the creation
of the profile and the first message, and the fraction of the received messages to which
the account replies. This system is similar to other anti-spam systems that have been
proposed by the research community [13, 24, 31].
3.2 IP Address-based Detection System
Systems that detect automated misuse on online services often look at the reuse of IP
addresses by miscreants [20, 30]. This element is not as important when dealing with
online dating scammers, because, as we will show in Section 6.2, they typically do
not use high levels of automation for their operations. However, IP address reuse is
still an useful indicator to detect those scammers with a lower level of sophistication,
who create a number of different profiles to advertise their businesses. Similarly, some
sophisticated scammers might create a handful of profiles, and access them from the
same IP address or network. For these reasons, DATINGSITE deployed a system that
flags multiple accounts accessed by the same IP address as possibly malicious.
3.3 Photograph-based Detection System
Previous research noted that spammers that are active on Online Social Networks typi-
cally reuse profile pictures for their fake accounts [31]. For this reason, it makes sense
to look for profiles that share the same profile picture to find possible fake accounts on
those platforms. We observed the same trend happening on online dating sites. Although
scams are usually run by humans and do not have the scale of spam campaigns on other
online services, scammers often use the same picture (typically of an attractive young
woman or a handsome middle-aged man) for a multitude of accounts. DATINGSITE de-
ployed a system that is able to detect duplicated profile pictures and flag those accounts
as possibly malicious. This system is based on a perceptual hashing algorithm [39], to
be able to detect images that look the same, but have been re-encoded.
3.4 Text-based Detection System
Content analysis is a popular way of fighting spam [11, 29]. Such systems typically
identify words that are indicative of malicious and benign content and leverage them
for detection. Content analysis systems work well in automatically detecting spam. In
our specific case, they can be useful in detecting scammers who employ a low level
of sophistication (for example, who send a copy of the same message to many other
profiles). For this reason, DATINGSITE developed a system that looks for keywords in
messages that are typical of scam accounts, and flag them as malicious.
Because of their differences, each detection system is more suited to detect different
types of scam accounts. For example, the photograph and text based systems are more
suited to detect accounts that are part of large scale campaigns and share the same pic-
ture or the same profile text. On the other hand, the behavioral-based detection system
works best in detecting advanced scammers, who set up their own accounts and ex-
change a long series of manually-crafted messages with the victim before performing
the actual scam.
4 Description of the Scam Account Dataset
Previous work showed anecdotes and case studies of scams on online dating sites [28,
36]. In this paper, we provide the first large-scale measurement of online dating scams,
performed over a period of 11 months between 2012 and 2013. Our analysis is based on
a set of scam accounts detected by the systems described previously on DATINGSITE.
In particular, we analyze a dataset composed of the scam accounts detected on DAT-
INGSITE during the period of observation. In total, the dataset is composed of 510,503
scam accounts.
Note that, since the detections performed by the detection systems were manually
vetted by human analysts, we are confident that they were correct, taking aside potential
mistakes made by the analystsThis “clean” set of malicious accounts allowed us to
come up with a taxonomy of online dating scammers. In the next section we discuss
this taxonomy in detail.
5 A Taxonomy of Online Dating Scammers
With the help of the human analysts employed by DATINGSITE, we further analyzed the
scam accounts in our dataset. We identified four types of scammers that infest the site:
“Escort Service Advertisements,” “Dates for Profit,” “Swindlers,” and “Matchmaking
Services.” Although some of the scammer schemes that we identified are specific to
the Chinese culture and society, we think that this taxonomy holds also for dating sites
located in other countries. In the following, we describe the types of scams that we
identified. In Section 6 we analyze the scammers that we detected in the wild more in
detail, breaking them down by scam type, and we investigate the different demographics
that they use to attract victims, as well the different strategies that they use.
Escort Service Advertisements. As we said, the bulk creation of accounts with the pur-
pose of spreading spam is not a viable solution for cybercriminals operating on online
dating sites. However, this does not prevent miscreants from creating a number of ac-
counts and sending unsolicited advertisements to the users of the dating site. Although
this type of activity is not as predominant as it is on other media (such as online social
networks [31] and email [33]) we still observed it on DATINGSITE. It is interesting to
note that, since the main purpose of an online dating site is to connect two people who
do not know each other, the concept of unsolicited messages has little meaning on such
platforms. For this reason, it is more difficult to fight spammers on online dating sites
than it is on other services.
On DATINGSITE, the vast majority of unsolicited advertisements promote escort
agencies. In total, we detected 374,051 accounts of this type during our study. In this
scheme, cybercriminals operate as follows: first, they create a profile belonging to a
young woman (often including an attractive picture). Then, they start contacting other
profiles, including the contact information of the escort agency in their messages. Note
that considering accounts that contact a large number of profiles as malicious is usually
not enough. In fact, legitimate accounts that contact many profiles, trying to establish a
contact, are not uncommon on online dating sites; previous work showed that 78% of
the messages sent on online dating sites never receive a reply from the other person [14].
We confirm this low turnaround of messages in Section 6.2.
Dates for Profit. As we said, the purpose of using online dating sites is to meet peo-
ple in person and possibly start a relationship. This opens additional possibilities for
scammers, who can leverage the fact that their victims will want to meet them in person
and perform the actual scam once this happens. This element has no parallel on other
online services. Even in advanced “419 scams,” which rely on social engineering, the
only “physical” interaction between the scammer and the victim is the transfer of a sum
of money.
On DATINGSITE, we observed an interesting trend in scams that exploit in-person
meetings. Owners of establishments such as cafes and restaurants would hire girls to
create profiles on the online dating site, contact multiple victims, and ask them to meet
in person at that particular establishment. Such establishments are usually very expen-
sive, and it is customary in China for males to pay for food and drink on dates. There-
fore, the owners of the establishments can make a considerable amount of money out of
these scams. Obviously, after this first encounter, the victim is never contacted again. To
put this type of scam in perspective, a meal at most of the rogue establishments can cost
between $100 and $2,000. This amount of money is similar to what is gained by tradi-
tional “419 scams” [12]. However, the success rate of this type of scam is much higher,
because the scammer leverages the desire of the victim to meet an attractive woman. In
addition, it is likely that the victim will never realize that he has been scammed, since
the date really happened, and the victim possibly had a good time. Therefore, there is
a low chance for the owner of the establishment to get caught. In total, we detected
57,218 accounts of this type during our study.
This particular type of scam appears to be a popular scheme for scammers on DAT-
INGSITE, as we will show in Section 6. Although the cultural setting of China might
make such scams more likely to be successful, we do not see a reason why similar
scams should not be happening on dating sites based in other countries too.
Swindlers. Online dating sites are seen as a valuable resource for mid-aged people who
so far have not found a partner for life. This type of person is particularly vulnerable to
scams, and scammers take advantage of it. We observed multiple instances of scammers
contacting mid-aged men and women, and establishing a long distance relationship
with them. Over time, the trust that the victim has in the scammer would grow. After
some time, the scammer will ask the victim to send him a sum of money to help in
some task. The scammer might be in financial trouble or need money to buy a plane
ticket to come visit the victim. At this point in the relationship, the victim is very likely
to trust the scammer and send him the required money. After sending the requested
amount of money, the victim will never hear back from the scammer. We call these type
of scammers “Swindlers.” Swindlers are a big problem on online dating sites. Similar
scam schemes have already been studied by previous work [28,36]. In total, we detected
43,318 accounts of this type during our study.
A particular type of swindlers, which are very peculiar to the culture of certain areas
of China, are what we call “Flower-basket Swindlers.” In this particular type of scam,
the scammer creates a fake profile, usually of an attractive mid-aged man, contacts a
mid-aged woman, and starts exchanging messages with her. Over time, the victim will
think that she is developing a romantic relationship with the scammer, and will start
trusting him. After a while, the scammer will start implying that he wants to marry the
victim, and that his parents need some proof of the victim’s “good will.” At this point
the scam happens. It is customary in those areas of China to send baskets of flowers to
newly-opened shops, as gifts and to wish good luck. The scammer will then pretend to
be opening a new shop, and will ask the victim to send some baskets of flowers to the
shop. He will also give her the contact information of a florist in his area, who is actually
one of the scammer’s accomplices. As for other swindler scams, once the victim buys
the flowers, she will never hear from the scammer again. These shipments of flowers
can be very expensive and cost up to $20,000 to the victim.
Another type of swindlers that we observed on DATINGSITE are the so-called “lottery-
ticket swindlers.” This type of scams is more similar to traditional “419 scams.” The
miscreant establishes a romantic relationship with the victim, by pretending to be a
successful businessperson in a foreign country, and lures the victim into sending him a
sum of money, as part of a rewarding financial operation.
Swindlers are present on all online dating sites and are not specific to DATINGSITE
or the Chinese culture in particular. On the other hand, flower-basket swindlers seem to
be leveraging a specific Chinese tradition, and this type of scam is probably peculiar to
Chinese online dating sites.
Previous research showed that scams perpetrated by email need to narrow down
the number of potential victims that will reply to their messages, because each message
requires some effort on the scammer part to reply to it [21]. For this reason, the scammer
sets up a story that is hardly believable to a general audience, making sure that whoever
responds is already prone to fall for the scam. In the case of online dating swindlers,
this does not happen. The scammer starts a long-lasting conversation with the potential
victims, and the purpose of the scam is revealed very late in the relationship. A partial
selection of users that are more likely to fall for the scam is performed by setting up
profiles that appeal a specific audience, such as mid-aged divorced women. We will
discuss more details on these strategies in Section 6.1.
Matchmaking services. Before online dating sites were popular, people used to sign
up for matchmaking services, which would find them a partner. We observe that agents
from these matchmaking services are active on online dating sites too. They typically
create fake profiles of attractive people, lure users into handing out some contact infor-
mation, and then contact them directly, advertising the matchmaking agency. Although
no financial scam is involved in the operation of matchmaking services, users are an-
noyed by them, and online dating sites see them as a competitor that is illicitly using
their site to gain customers. We detected 35,916 accounts of this type during our study.
In the next section we provide more details on the scam accounts that we detected
in the wild.
6 Analysis of the Scam Account Dataset
In this section we first analyze the different demographics and profile characteristics of
the various types of scam accounts that we detected, comparing them to the legitimate
accounts that were active on DATINGSITE during the analysis period. We then study
the modus operandi of the different types of scammers, providing new insights on how
these cybercriminal crews operate.
6.1 Demographics of Different Scam Account Types
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Fig. 1. Gender distribution of the different types of scam accounts, compared to legitimate ac-
counts.
As we mentioned, the different types of online dating scammers have very different
goals, and cater to a very different pool of victims. For this reason, the accounts that
they use to perpetrate their scams show very different characteristics, and impersonate
people with different demographics. Not only, but the population of malicious accounts
for each scam type shows reasonably homogeneous characteristics, which are very dif-
ferent from the general population on the dating site. In this section we analyze the
demographics of the different types of scam accounts that we detected.
We first analyzed the gender distribution of the different types of scam accounts.
As Figure 1 shows, legitimate accounts on DATINGSITE are mostly male, with a 65%
- 35% ratio compared to female accounts. Different types of scams, on the other hand,
aim at attracting victims from a specific gender, and therefore their gender ratio is dra-
matically skewed. For instance, “Dates for Profit” scammers try to lure men looking for
a date with an attractive lady to go to a particular establishment; therefore, the accounts
performing such scams are almost entirely female. A similar situation holds for “Escort
Services” scam accounts.
“Swindler” accounts, on the other hand, cater to an older audience composed mostly
of divorced or widowed ladies. For this reason, this type of scam accounts is prevalently
male. A similar reasoning goes for “Matchmaking Services” scam accounts. These ac-
counts mostly try to lure older women into handing out personal information such as
email addresses and phone numbers, and their gender distribution is in line with the one
of the legitimate user population of DATINGSITE.
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Fig. 2. Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the birth years of the different types of scam
accounts, compared to legitimate accounts.
The purpose of the different types of scammers is also reflected in the different ages
of the profiles that they use. As Figure 2 shows, 50% of the legitimate users on DAT-
INGSITE are 26 years old or older. “Dates for Profit” and ”Escort Services” accounts
list themselves as slightly younger than average, with an average age of 25 and 24 re-
spectively. In particular, 20% of the “Escort Services” profile list their age as between
20 and 18 (which is the minimum age allowed on DATINGSITE). In comparison, only
1% of the normal users is younger than 20 on the site. Because they target older vic-
tims, “Swindler” profiles are a lot older on average: 50% of these accounts pretend to
be at least 46 years old, with only 3% of them younger than the average age on the site.
“Matchmaking Services” accounts are older than average as well, although not as much
as “Swindler” accounts: 50% of them are older than 35, while 18% of them is younger
than the average age on DATINGSITE.
The final element for which scam accounts differ from regular users is marital sta-
tus. As Figure 3 shows, more than 85% of the regular users on DATINGSITE are single.
Scam accounts mostly list themselves as single as well, probably because they cater to
the majority of the users on the site, and in general it is a more neutral connotation.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show this trend for “Dates for Profit,” “Matchmaking Services,”
and “Escort Agencies” scam accounts respectively. A notable exception are “Swindler”
scam accounts. As it is shown in Figure 4, these accounts prevalently list themselves as
widowed or divorced. The reason for that is that these accounts need to build a believ-
able story, as we mentioned in Section 4, and being widowed is a good starting point
to establish trust and a long-lasting relationship with an emotionally fragile person, and
eventually steal her money.
To recap, in this section we confirmed that stereotypes do exist for each type of
scammer: while “Dates for Profit” and “Escort Agency Services” mostly present them-
selves as young, single females, “Swindlers” present themselves as mid-aged, widowed
men.
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6.2 Strategies Used by Different Scam Account Types
Another interesting aspect is looking at the different strategies used by different types of
scammers to reach victims. In the previous section we analyzed how different types of
scammers set up their accounts to look appealing to a different audience, such as older
women or younger men. After setting up a profile, a scammer needs to attract victims.
This is probably the most challenging part, because replying to a number of users who
are not really convinced of the authenticity of the scam profile is time consuming for the
scammer. As previous research noted, it is very advantageous for a scammer to make
sure that the accounts that either reach out to him or that will reply to his first message
are likely to fall for the scam [21]. In this section we show that some types of scammers
are more successful in doing this.
In general a scammer has two strategies while trying to attract victims: he can con-
tact users on the dating site himself, or he can make his account so appealing that a num-
ber of potential victims will contact him themselves. To understand the typical strate-
gies put in practice by scammers, we first looked at the number of accounts contacted
by scam accounts. As Figure 8 shows, scam accounts typically contact many more ac-
counts than legitimate users on DATINGSITE do. Legitimate accounts contact a small
number of profiles: from our observations, 50% of them contacted at most four profiles,
while only 20% accounts contacted more than 27 profiles. Conversely, the majority of
scam accounts contacted 100 or more profiles during their activity on DATINGSITE.
This shows that scam accounts are on average a lot more aggressive in contacting other
people on the dating site than regular users. Note that these numbers are a lower bound,
because the scam accounts in our dataset were shut down by the support people at DAT-
INGSITE, and therefore would have contacted more victims if they were left free to
act.
Instead of contacting their victims, scammers can wait for users to contact them.
This approach has the advantage that whoever contacts a scam account is more likely to
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Fig. 8. Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the accounts contacted by the different types
of scammers, compared to legitimate users.
be genuinely interested in him/her. On the scammer side, all he needs to do is setting up
a profile that is appealing to potential victims. Figure 9 shows the CDF of the number
of messages initiating a conversation received by different types of accounts on DAT-
INGSITE. As it can be seen, 50% of legitimate accounts were contacted at least once
by another user on the dating site. We observe a two-fold distribution in the success
of scam accounts. “Escort Services” and “Matchmaking Services” are on average less
successful than regular accounts in receiving attention from users on the site, although
these numbers are not dramatically lower than what we observe for legitimate users.
The reason for this lower turnaround might be that these profiles look phony, and they
do not appear believable to many users. Also, these accounts are usually easier to rec-
ognize by the human specialists than more advanced types of scam accounts, and are
therefore “frozen” quickly, so that possible victims cannot contact them anymore. This
is in line with previous research, which showed that social network users are fairly good
in realizing whether a profile is fake, although their detection rate is not perfect [34].
“Swindlers” and “Dates for Profit” scam accounts, on the other hand, attract more vic-
tims on average: 70% of these accounts were contacted by at least a user on the site,
while 20% of the “Swindler” accounts were contacted by at least 90 potential victims.
All together, this shows that advanced scammers are remarkably successful in setting
up profiles that appeal their potential victim audience, and, unlike the less sophisticated
types of scams, their profiles are considered legitimate by many users.
We then analyzed how often scam accounts reply to the messages they receive from
potential victims. Figure 10 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function of the number
of replies that different types of scam accounts sent as responses to messages they re-
ceived. As it can be seen, legitimate users rarely reply to the messages they received:
only 14% of the users ever replied to a message on the site1, and more in general only
1 Note that this number takes into accounts also those accounts that never received a message at
all on the site.
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Fig. 9. Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the number of messages received by different
types of scammer accounts, compared to legitimate users.
7% of the messages that are sent on DATINGSITE ever receive a reply. This result is in
line with what was shown by previous research [14]. Looking at scam accounts, we see
a clear two-fold distribution: “Escort Services” and “Matchmaking Services” reply even
less than regular users. The reason for this is that these scams are typically composed
of a single spam-like message, and do not involve message exchanges with their vic-
tims. In addition to that, these accounts show the tendency of being quickly abandoned
by the scammers, or being shut down by the DATINGSITE operators. “Swindlers” and
“Dates for profit,” on the other hand, are a lot more likely to start conversations with
their victims: around 50% of these accounts sent replies to potential victims after being
contacted. The fact that they do not reply to about half of the messages they receive,
on the other hand, shows that scammers are carefully choosing which users to engage
with, favoring the ones that are more likely to fall for the scam. This shows that these
scams are more sophisticated and require a longer set up (and a longer exchange of mes-
sages). For this reason, these types of scammers take the time to reply to the messages
they receive, crafting them in a way that it will make them appealing and believable to
potential victims.
Finally, we studied the way in which different types of scammers connected to their
accounts. Previous work showed that malicious accounts on social networks are typi-
cally controlled by botnets [19,31], which are networks of compromised computers act-
ing under the same cybercriminal. Botnets provide a convenient way for cybercriminals
to control their malicious accounts, and run large-scale campaigns on online services.
To investigate the modus operandi of the connections performed by different types of
scammers on DATINGSITE, we studied the number of scam accounts of the same type
that were accessed by single IP addresses. Although observing multiple accounts con-
necting from the same IP address is not suspicious per se, and it is usually an artifact
of Network Address Translation (NAT) networks, having a high number of accounts
accessed by the same IP address is highly suspicious. Figure 11 shows the CDF of the
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Fig. 10. Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the replies sent by the different types of
scammers in reply to messages they received, compared to legitimate users.
number of different scam accounts accessed by a single IP address on DATINGSITE.
As it can be seen, legitimate accounts are typically accessed by only one IP address
during a period of one week (85% of them). Although it is more common to have IP
addresses that access many accounts, the ratio of scam accounts accessed by multiple
IP addresses is low too: it is rare to have IP addresses that accessed more than ten scam
accounts, and the majority of them accessed a single IP address. This does not give us
conclusive evidence that scammers are using botnets to perform their malicious activity
on DATINGSITE. The reason for this is that online dating scams require quite a bit of in-
teraction by the scammer to succeed, and are more difficult to automate than traditional
spam or phishing operations. Reports by the human experts at DATINGSITE, as well as
by law enforcement, show that an exception to this trend are “Escort Services” scam
accounts, whose accounts are usually controlled by bots. Still, these bots are typically
used in isolation or in small numbers, and therefore we have no indication that these
types of scammers are taking advantage of botnets.
7 Discussion
Online dating scams are a relatively new problem and present very unique aspects,
compared to traditional Internet threats. In this paper we described in detail the insights
that we obtained by analyzing the scam accounts detected on a large online dating
site over a period of one year. Many points are open and will be the focus of future
research. In this section, we first discuss the efforts needed to secure online dating sites
from scammers, both from the policy and the technical side. Finally, we introduce some
ideas that we are planning to pursue as future work.
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7.1 Scammers are Perseverant
According to the human experts at DATINGSITE, each individual scam on the site is
usually set up and performed by a small number of people, composed of two to five
individuals. For example, a typical “Date for Profit” scam will involve the owner of
a restaurant, a girl who agrees to go on a date with the victim, and optionally a third
person who interacts with the online dating site. Similarly, a “Flower-basket swindler”
scam is performed by a person interacting with the victim on the dating site and by
an accomplice who pretends to own a flower shop. Optionally, other accomplices will
pretend to be family members of the scammer, and contact the victim to test her “good
will.” This is quite different than what we observe in traditional cybercriminal schemes,
in which there are many actors involved, and a complex economy exists behind these
operations.
Based on the reports by the DATINGSITE human experts, there are a number of
scammer groups that keep using DATINGSITE to perform their scams, even after their
fake accounts are detected and blocked. This happens because the scams that these
groups perform on the site are particularly remunerative for them. The perseverance
showed by online dating scammers teaches researchers two lessons: first, better detec-
tion systems are needed, to make sure that the scam accounts are detected and shut down
quicker, making life more difficult for the scammers. We hope that some of the insights
provided in this paper, such as the typical demographics and behaviors showed by scam
accounts will help practitioners in developing more effective detection techniques. Sec-
ond, similar to other cybercriminal operations, it is difficult to get rid of scammers
by just securing the online service. In many cases, an action from law enforcement is
needed to prosecute those scammers who are most dangerous. Law enforcement opera-
tions are typically difficult to coordinate when we deal with cybercriminal schemes that
are spread across multiple countries, but should be more feasible in the case of DAT-
INGSITE, in which the site, the victims, and the scammers all reside in the same country.
Similar law enforcement measures might get more complicated for online dating sites
that have a more international user base, such as match.com or okcupid.com.
7.2 Future Work
Aside from law enforcement efforts, online dating scams can be made less successful
by improving the effectiveness of detection systems deployed on the online dating site.
As we showed in this paper, detecting the more advanced types of scammers, such as
“Swindlers,” is challenging, because the activity of these accounts is not automatically
generated, and their scams unfold over a long period of time and several exchanges of
messages with the victim. To detect the majority of these scam accounts, DATINGSITE
administrators decided to have a better recall over precision for their anti-scam systems,
and to employ a team of human experts to vet such detections.
In this paper, however, we showed that scam accounts show differences from legit-
imate accounts in the way they set up their profiles, in the way they select the people
they chat with, and in the way they interact with the site. Such differences could be the
base for developing effective detection techniques that could work with minimal hu-
man interaction. In addition, future work could include the use of stylometry to detect
message language that might be typical of scams [5].
We are aware that the insights provided in this paper are only the first step into un-
derstanding and fighting scammers on online dating sites. In particular, although many
of the scams that we identified are likely to happen on other online dating sites too,
our analysis is limited to DATINGSITE, and therefore might be biased toward the Chi-
nese culture. In the future, we are interested in studying online dating sites based in
other countries. In particular, online dating sites with an international audience might
attract scammers that are located in different countries than the victim; tracking these
schemes might be challenging, but could give interesting insights on how to fight the
phenomenon. In addition, we are interested in studying the underground economy be-
hind these scams, such as tracking how much money is actually stolen as a consequence
of these schemes. We would also like to study online dating sites that require users to
pay a monthly subscription. We suspect that the population of scammers on such sites
will be heavily skewed towards more advanced schemes.
8 Related Work
The popularity of online dating sites has attracted a wealth of research. Fiore et al.
performed an analysis of the demographic characteristics of online dating users, as well
as of the characteristics of the messages that those users exchange [14]. Chen et al.
presented a work that analyzed the social network of the users on an online dating
site [10]. Hitsch et al. looked at what characteristics influence the chance of an online
dating message to receive a reply [22].
Our work is the first comprehensive study on online dating scams. A few previ-
ous papers provided case studies of single scam schemes happening on online dating
sites [27, 28, 36], while Wang et al. observed that miscreants crawl online dating sites,
and use the crawled pictures to set up fake online dating accounts, which they then use
for their scams [35]. Unlike these preliminary works, our paper provides a comprehen-
sive study of the scams that happen on a large online dating site, and gives real-world
numbers on how prevalent such scams are.
Online dating scams that try to lure a victim into sending money to the miscreant
have many points in common with the so-called “419 scams.” This type of scams has
been widely studied by the research community [12, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25]. Despite the
similarities, in this paper we showed that online dating scams are very different from
these schemes, because they typically involve a long exchange of messages between the
scammer and the victim before the actual scam is performed.
Many systems have been presented to detect spam and malicious activity on social
networks. Some systems analyze the characteristics of social network accounts, looking
for sign of mass-created fake accounts [7, 16, 24, 31, 40, 42]. Other systems look at the
social network structure of accounts, or at how the messages posted by them spread,
looking for anomalies indicative of a malicious profile [8, 9, 15, 32, 38, 41]. These sys-
tems work well in detecting automated activity finalized at spreading malicious content.
However, they are often ineffective in detecting advanced scams, such as the ones pre-
sented in this paper. The reason is that such scams require a lot of manual effort by
the attackers, and often times span through long periods of time (and multiple message
exchanges between the victim and the scammer).
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the problem of online dating scams. We analyzed a set of
ground-truth scam accounts on a large online dating site, and provided a taxonomy of
the different types of scams that we observed. We showed that different types of scam-
mers targeted different audiences, and have a very different success rate in attracting
victims. In particular, we showed that advanced scammers are more successful than
regular users in getting attention by other online dating users, which can potentially
turn into scam victims. This paper is the first large-scale measurement of online dating
scams, and it sheds light on these operations and on the challenges that researchers face
in fighting them. Future work will focus on developing better detection techniques to
block even the stealthiest scammers, and studying new types of online dating scams.
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